In a wide ranging interview with David Frost broadcast on Al Jazeera TV on Friday 24 April, Pervez Musharraf discussed his despondence at what was going on in Pakistan, why he feels that the situation is redeemable (if the government can regain the trust of the people), why terrorism and extremism (along with the economy) remain the main problems confronted by Pakistan, why the Taleban today are a bigger danger than al Qaeda to Pakistan and the world, why there is little danger of their overrunning Pakistan, his own past and future, and other observations that tell us as much if not more about General Musharraf than about Pakistan.

In the end, Frost squeezed out an “I am ready to serve if Pakistan calls” statement from Musharraf, that was blown out of all proporions in the media. The interview, available on You Tube, in two segments, can be seen below:

An informal, unofficial, transcript of the interview (with no guarantees) is also given below.

Transcript:

Frost: Hello, and welcome to Frost Over the World. Today, in an exclusive interview, we are speaking to the man who ruled Pakistan for almost a decade. Former president Musharraf is with us here in the studio, now. Later we’ll hear about the South African elections, and ask why it is that the Somali pirates appear to be so successful, and untouchable. But first, it was a miitary coup in 1999 which brought General Musharraf, the head of the Pakistan army, to power. You remained in charge for almost ten years. And during that time Pakistan changed quite a lot. Most notably perhaps it became a focal point for the US war on terror, declared after 9/11. President Musharraf fell from power in August last year when in a rare — indeed what became a very rare — show of unity, opposing political parties worked together to oust him. In the end he resigned, and is here now. Thank you for being with us.

Musharraf: My pleasure.

Frost: Tell me, uhm what are your feelings today; as you look at the current state of your homeland, of Pakistan. I mean, uhm, what are your emotions, as you see the situation now?

Musharraf: Very sad, I feel sad, and… [pause] despondent, at whatever is happening; because, Pakistan is suffering.

Frost: Despondent, and sad, yes. And, do you think with all the list of problems that there are at the moment, and food shortages and power shortages and turmoil with… and indeed the insurgents and the rise of extremism and all of these things and the economy… uhm do you think … if you’d, still been there, that you could have dealt with some of those, successfully. Or, is it just an, insoluble problem?

Musharraf: No, no, not at all, I think my experience of nine years shows that the nation has a great potential and it has all the resources, it also has the acumen, the people are intelligent, to understand what the problems are and resolving them. So its not the problem of lack of understanding, of lack of resources,  or lack of potential. The people unfortunately…. The people have to have confidence in the government, and if that happens, I think the situation is recoverable.

Frost: Its recoverable…

Musharraf: Yes.

Frost: And, and what, what should the president or the parliament do most? What is the most urgent task to deal with?

Musharraf: I think terrorism; terrorism and extremism. That poses a danger to Pakistan, and of course to the region and the world. But basically to Pakistan; that needs to be addressed. And the other is the economy, because I think if the economy is on a downturn, and going down, nosediving downwards, then you can’t address any other issue. You will be begging others. So these are the two critical issues.

Frost:  In terms of the security issue, and so on, in your book  which was written basically in 2006, you said that … you estimated, that there were probably 300 seasoned fighters from al Qaeda, somewhere in Pakistan. What would the figure be like today?

Musharraf: I can’t be… it will just be a guess, but certainly they are more than three hundred. Initially these are al Qaeda, the same people who were holed up, the Mujahideen who were holed up since… in the ’79 to ’89… we brought about twenty five to thirty thousand Mujahedin here. After ’89, after the victory over the Soviets, they were not rehabiliated or resettled, so they remained there. Everyone left us, and so Pakistan had to fend for them. These were the people who became al Qaeda, so they were a lot. But then after the breakup of Soviet Union, lot of Chechens and Uzbeks came in. So I think now… But then Pakistan acted, our forces; they were in our cities and in the mountains. They are no more in the cities; in the mountains, yes they are. Now how many are there? I wouldn’t be able to give a figure; but certainly much more than three, four hundred.

Frost: Yea. Is there a possibility that the insurgents, and the militants, and so on, could win, and overthrow the government of Pakistan?

Musharraf: I don’t think so. I don’t think so; unless we blunder, keep blundering and giving them space. They are militant, they are aggressive, and the vast majority of Pakistan are moderate, but they are… they get scared of people who are brandishing weapons, and killing, and slaughtering people. So, if we… loosen on the use of force, err, then we keep giving space to them, and that is how they keep getting encouraged and expanding. But as far as the control of the government is concerned, in the elections in 2007, err 2008, the result was totally anti, religous parties. Religious parties who had about 17% of the votes, seats, in the 2002 elections, got only about 3 or 4%; even in the frontier province where the religious party coalition ruled for five years, they were totally rejected and eliminated, and it was the ANP, which is a moderate party, they won the vote bank, even in Swat, where there is problem. So there is no way that they can win through an election and come into government in Pakistan.

Frost: And what about the situation like the sort of compromise that was worked out in the Swat valley and so on where…, they allowed some sharia law, again, and so on, with the dangers of the various punishments for sharia law, and so no; from what you are saying, that is the wrong way to deal with militants.

Musharraf: Well, now, when we are talking about Swat yes I said any compromise, on a position of strength, when you are dealing with them, is the wrong way. We must deal politically, but from a position of strength. But when you talk of particularly of Swat and sharia, there is a little bit of confusion in the understanding of the world. In Swat it all started that the people were demanding speedy and cheap justice, Nizam-e-Adl, what they were saying, calling it Nizam-e-Adl. Because Swat, historically, up to 1969 was a state, under the Wali of Swat … Wali is like a Nawab, in charge… They were dispensing justice very fast. In ’69 it was absorbed into Pakistan and here our legal system went with, with all its defects, and shortcomings, and delays. So that people’s demand on fast, speedy justice always remained. Now, the deal now, initially was on Nizam-e-Adl, that you give them speedy, Kazi Courts, speedy cheap justice. Now to that extent its good; but if that means that it will be out of the legal system of Pakistan, the, the high courts, the supreme courts, there is a legal system functioning in the, in, in Pakistan. So whatever you do in Swat must be within that legal system, legal structure. If it is outside that legal structure, you cannot have a … It’s a challenge to the writ of the government. And if the same people are demanding things beyond that, that their, their judgmens will not be challengeable, and then they are… they, they started [ad]opting measures of punishing people for, for things that… probably, a moderate person would not, err, thinks it is tolerable, err, so that becomes challenging to the writ of the government. So there is a bit of a confusion, err which the governent must face boldly. Speedy, cheap justice must be ensured; within the legal ambit of Pakistan, and the constitution of Pakistan. But denying the constitution of Pakistan and bringng laws which are different from Pakistan, must not be allowed.

Frost: And in the situation of the law, and so on, uhm tell me, are you, do you feel, safe when you are in Pakistan? Safe from the revenge of your enemies, as it were? Two of your opponents, or enemies, or whatever, both Mr. Nawaz Sharif, and Mr. Chaudhry, the chief justice, both of them you threw out, as it were, and er do you think they both like revenge on you?

Musharraf: Wel, errr Mr. Nawaz Sharif is all the time talking of it. But from legal, constitutional, point of view, there is no way that I have done anything wrong: legally, and constitutionally. So, therefore I feel confident. But then again, one has to face, whatever, if they want to go into the illegal and unconstitutional mode, well that is different.

Frost: Yes, but they, but also of course they can’t… there are a lot of things that they can’t do anyway because as the Nation reported, I mean you, you in fact were able before, before you resigned on August the 18th, to negotiate immunity from civil and prosection charges  that might come from your nine years. That was an important thing for you that.

Musharraf: Yes. Yes indeed. Err, err all the actions that I took, err whether it was ’99, or beyond, have legal cover, err constitutional and legal. So therefore, yes, it was the same supreme court, with an eleven member bench, which has passed judgments, err, declaring whatever I did, as quite all right.

Frost: And, and in terms of, and in terms of the, the coming against you, on on legal points, I mean the, presumably the immunity would cover anything they brought up?

Musharraf: Immunity is… I don’t know what you… the President of Pakistan has immunity when in office, but beyond that he doesn’t have immunity as such. But, as I said, the action have been legalised through Supreme Court judgments.

Frost: So that, so that you would be confident… In that situation could they, could they bring in the thing, to the exit veto, whereby, whence you go back to Pakistan, you are not allowed to leave again. Could they do that to you?

Musharraf: Well, it has legal hitches… err there has to be a case against me, err there is no case against me in the courts, err the case has to be under trial, and err so at the moment there is no such possibility.

Frost: Right. But, but, Mr. Chaudhry is said to have a file, that he’s, he’s going through, about you, he’s said, he’s said to have… [inaudible]

Musharraf: Everyone maintains files on each other [both laugh] unfortunately. I keep saying that one has to, with what Pakistan is facing, we ought to be looking forward, instead of getting bogged down against each other, we need to look at the country, we need to save the country, and move it forward on the path of progress and development. That, if we keep getting bogged down in past events, and also get bogged down in personal vendettas, I am afraid Pakistan will keep suffering.

Frost: [Grunt] But just on that one point: they can’t put you on the Exit Control List, you are saying?

Musharraf: Urw, well, no, I wouldn’t say, I wouldn’t, couldn’t say that. It is the courts who have to decide. But from legal points of view, as I said, there is no reason absolutely.

Frost: Let’s go back to the beginning of your presidency…

Musharraf: As I understand the legalities… [laughter]

Frost: Yeah! I bet you do, yeah. The… Let’s go back to the, to the first days, when you, when you, when your coup succeeded in 19, ’99, uhm was the reason, was in fact, uhm Nawaz Sharif’s, err unconditional surrender, as you put it, over Kargil; was that the thing that made you feel, he’s got to go?

Musharraf: Err, No, no, not at all. Not at all. He went and… although he keeps projecting that I sent him to United States to talk to president Clinton, to save the army from Kargil and all that, which is absolutely wrong; he went himself and the army was perfectly fine, whatever it had done, we were very confident. But, as far as he must go, my decision, no, I didn’t take such a decision at all. I was in Sri Lanka. In fact just a few days before I went to Sri Lanka, he had made me the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the army Chief, both of them, for which I was thankful. And I went to Sri Lanka fully confident about the situation, and in fact throughout my one year stay as army chief, I always told him that Pakistan is in trouble, but the army is prepared to assist you, help you, and that is how we helped him in WAPDA, we even helped him even to establish military courts. It was only when I was coming back from Sri Lanka that he himself decided not to allow me to enter Pakistan and to leave Pakistan airspace and go into some other country, wherever. The, the, air, the airbases, the airports were all, black… there was a blackout on all airports, we couldn’t land anywhere, we were forced to go out, all this happened, and that is how the army reacted, on ground. I was not even in contact with them.

Frost: That’s right, and there, and there were buses and other things blocking the runway in Karachi… and, and so… and, and how many minutes gas did you have left…

Musharraf: Seven, or eight minutes, I think

Frost: [inaudible]

Musharraf: …and the pilot told me that if there was a jerk or a air pocket, we’ll crash.

Frost: Erh, really? So it was that close, that close. Of course, very soon, uhm 9/11 changed your presidency, didn’t it, really?

Musharraf: Well, ahmm, from some points of view positively, some points of view negatively, because I think I had an agenda. The supreme court gave me three years and they also said that I cannot bring about major constitutional changes. Now, in those three years, I had an agenda to reform the civil services, restructure the government, which I couldn’t do then. Because, because of the distraction after 9/11 to fight terrorism, extremism, al Qaeda and then, finally, Taleban, etc. It was a total distraction. So those three years couldn’t be used fully concentrating on the, on the progress and development of the state and welfare, well-being of the people…

Frost: But I mean, was it a difficult decision to take, to join the alliance, against the Taleban, and against Terror. I mean, did that cut off some of your options within Pakistan?

Musharraf: No, umh I think it was a very very right decision from Pakistan’s point of view. I mean even when Taleban were in Afghanistan and we were the only country who had recognised the Taleban, err and had our mission there — the other two were Saudi Arabia and UAE, but they had closed their missions — err, I always believed and I even told president Clinton this, when he came in 2000, when he said that you… I mean he was trying to tell me that Pakistan ought to break relations; I said the opposite strategey, I said that everyone should recognise them, open their mission, so that we can change them from within. I rec… I understood that they are very obscurantist in their views; we don’t want that kind of Islam in Pakistan. We don’t want Talibanization in Pakistan. So while we had our mission, certainly, we, not only I but the whole government and the whole of, people of Pakistan, didn’t want that kind of obscurantism in Pakistan. So it was easy for me to… to take a decision that was a favourable decision. We didn’t want that kind of Islam in Pakistan.

Frost: So, who, who do you think today is the greater threat to Pakistan and the world, between the Taleban and al Qaeda?

Musharraf: Taleban.

Frost: Taleban.

Musharraf: Yea

Frost: Because of their, because of their level of support?

Musharraf: Because they are the population; they, they get strength from the population. Al Qaeda doesn’t get strength from the population. If you deal with the tribal elders in the various agencies, they are prepared to… agree to getting rid of all the foreigners, al Qaeda. But if you, if many of them would like to go across the border, and fight with the Taleban there against the coalition forces.

Frost: And in, when, when, as we come toward the period of your negotiations with Benazir Bhutto, and so on, umh, during that period, I read the… on July the 27th, or whatever, (which I would have been, I suppose 2007), umh you did actually meet to talk, to negotiate, to talk about a coalition? You actually met?

Musharraf: Twice.

Frost: Twice.

Musharraf: Yes.

Frost: Where did you meet?

Musharraf: Abu Dhabi.

Frost: Abu Dhabi, hunh; and those, those negotiations went well?

Musharraf: I think that they went very well.

Frost: And it could’ve, it could’ve been put into action if… there hadn’t been the tragedy, or if there had been a different result in the election?

Musharraf: If, er the tragedy of Benazir, assassination, and also her returning… umh she was not supposed to return before the elections.

Frost: Umh. Oh I see. She was, she’d agreed to wait until then…

Musharraf: Yea.

Frost: …so the elections would have happened, and she would have survived the elections. Because you realised that she would be in even more danger than you would be, during an election?

Musharraf: Yes there were threats on her, yes, certainly, and we even got intelligence reports from, from the UAE; and I told her, personally, that there are threats, very very potent threats. If you don’t believe us, we’ve got intelligence from UAE; but she came. There were certain threats, when she landed, and she travelled from the airport . There were definite threats of a number of suicide bomb teams, presence; she ignored all that. And there was a, bomb blasts en route, and so many people killed. And then, when she went to address this public gathering in Rawalpindi, this is a very very busy, and a very congested location, in the Liaquat… but it’s popular for political activity. On the first time she wanted to go there, I did not allow her to go there, because there was a definite threat, at that time. And I said, you must not, and unfortunately they made a lot of hue and cry against me, that I am not allowing her political activity, but it was simply a threat to her life. The next time, then she ignored all that, I said OK, she wants to go [laughs] let her go, she is not understanding. And, then you know what happened.

Frost: Yea.

Musharraf: Unfortunately.

Frost: Unfortunately. She was a brave woman. But in that case, you would have said she didn’t listen enough…

Musharraf: Yes. Absolutely. Absolutely.

Frost:  …in that particular situation.

Musharraf: Absolutely. You should see the… just a week.. or two, two weeks, maybe earlier, where she was not allowed to go, and what all the People’s Party, her party, said, against me. That I a not allowing political activity whereas that was not the case.

Frost: And that, and that was not, that was not the case. That was a tragic, a tragic incident. The… when it came time for you to step down, how difficult a decision was that to take? Or was it just obvious that you’d had several years of the economy going well, and things like that, but now your time had come, as it were…

Musharraf: Yea

Frost: …how difficult was it to decide that?

Musharraf: Wehh, very honestly speaking, the difficulty was not from my personal point of view. I don’t have an ego, I don’t have any lust for any riches and all that, that I must remain in position and perpetuate myself permanently. That was not the case, so it was easy for me personally. But I knew, that it would lead to tremendous amount of turmoil; that was the difficulty, the difficulty was from Pakistan’s point of view. So, finally, but when I saw that it’s inevitable and that even if I stay on I’ll be some kind of an impotent president, what is the point in staying? I am not the kind of person who sits around uselessly. I can’t be a useless man. So therefore I took the decision, and I think I was right in my judgment of what will happen to Pakistan.

Frost: Wh… which we talked about earlier, and, and, and so, and in terms of, in terms of the, the situation there, you said how things would have been different if you’d, uhm, if you’d still been, still been there in power, and so on, but the… What about the relationship, today, with America? That’s… Is that healthy now? Or, not as healthy when you were there?

Musharraf: Ther is a… unfortunately, a trust deficit, I think, and the…

Frost: A trust deficit?

Musharraf: Yea, err as far as the attitude of the people of Pakistan toward the United States, it remains the same, almost, if not a little worse; but as far as the, the worst part of the whole situation is where there is a trust deficit in United States agaist the ISI, and in many quarters, against the army. Now that is a very serious situation which never existed. These are the two institutions which are the guarantors of stability of Pakistan. They are the two institutions which have played a critical role, and an important role, throughout the last three decades, from ’79 onwards, in whatever we wanted them to do, whatever the government wanted them to do. Now if we have to fight terrorism and extremism, and these two institutions are to be mistrusted, who in Pakistan is going to fight terrorism and extremism. I mean they are the people who are going to do that. So how can we have such a wrong attitude towards them. So I think firstly, if anything has to be repaired, this trust deficit has to go, certainly. Otherwise, I think the two elements which are critical to fighting terrorism and extremism, they are demoralised and they are not getting the entire support.

Frost: We are going to extend this fascinating interview, after this break.

Frost: You mentioned, President Zardari, your successor, do you think he can pull this off? Do you think he is doing pretty well, or what?

Musharraf: No I wouldn’t like to comment on that. He’s trying…, maybe he’s trying his best; but, well, Pakistan is suffering. I mean anybody knows that, and I’m sure he also knows that, so he needs to put his act together and ensure that the government brings Pakistan out of the economic morass, the threat of terrorism and extremism, and I would say even, relations with India, this because that is another distraction.

Frost: Big distraction.

Musharraf: Yea.

Frost: Distraction to… [inaudible] during your time too.

Musharraf: But we were trying to, it was a distraction all since our independence, since 1947, but we tried our best to repair that, and get on the course of rapproachment, and we achieved a lot. We almost reached a resolution of, even the Kashmir dispute we were moving ahead, which is so critical. But then, now, with any minor incidents, terrorist incident, if there is war hysteria whipped up, more in India, not in Pakistan, in India, by politicians, by the media, if there is war hysteria, er er, then the gulf between the people increases. You create a war hysteria in India, the people start hating Pakistan, on something which… between Mr., Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and myself, in the Joint Communique we had mentioned that we will not allow terrorist acts to hinder, to impede the process of peace. Now, it is impeding, war hysteria, and delays, and now the whole peace process that we had initiated is in doldrums …

Frost: It’s in the doldrums now that the conditions, the relations, particularly after Mumbai, of course, are, are that much worse. Do you, do you think that it’s true that although Pakistanis were very much involved in Mumbai, that the Pakistan government was not, and the ISI, were not involved, do you…

Musharraf: Absolutely

Frost: … believe that?

Musharraf: Absolutely. See, David, I mean, these are… in Lahore, the incident that took place in Lahore, against the Sri Lankan team, lot of Pakistanis think that it is RAW involved. So should we create a war hysteria against RAW, just like they do against the ISI? ISI, army, is not involved in Bombay attacks. That is… terrorism has no nationality. I mean, the government has cooperated, in unearthing that Bombay incident. So they cannot whip up war hysteria because the government is not involved; and the army, and the ISI is not involved.

Frost: I see, ya. The, the chief justice, Mr. Chaudhry, umh said in a couple of quotes that he was investigating the question which I’ve read articles about and, [inaudible: therefore I wanted to ask you about] investigating the question of missing people, during your presidency, people who were detained or abducted in some way; how many such people were there, do you think?

Musharraf: This is quite a populist kind of a…

Frost:Ya.

Musharraf: …action. Unfortunately, I know the reality. They were initially talking of about 114, 115 missing people. These missing people are those who have joined some kind of Jihad somewhere, either Kashmir, or Afghanistan. I know one of the leaders, a person, a lady, who is talking of her husband missing. I personally know, because we investigated that, that he was involved in Jihad. If you see his photograph, you will say yourself, yes, this man must have gone somewhere and done something. They are missing on their own. We know that many young people went for Jihad into Kashmir, on their own, left their homes. I know of a school in Sargodha, one of the very prestigeous public schools, from where two children, two students, were missing. Their parents wrote to me, when I was the president, and we found out where they were. They were indoctrinated, and they went for Jihad, they went for Jihad.

Frost: I see

Musharraf: So these are the people who go on their own, and then people are talking of them being missing. They are missing on their own. They have left homes and gone for Jihad somewhere or the other.

Frost: So what you’re saying is that none of the missing people were… there were no government involvement or police involvement…

Musharraf: Not at all.

Frost: in abducting them…

Musharraf: Not at all.

Frost:You are saying that they did it, did it vol… The missing persons are missing, you are saying, because of their own decisions?

Musharraf: Yes. Dozens of Mujahideen groups, independent Mujahideen groups had come up, and people were joining them and going, and then this Taleban activity, people are going there. So therefore people from south Punjab, many I know, have gone and joined these… trying to join Taleban. So these are people who then are said to be missing, or whatever.

Frost: And so that… what you are saying obviously is that if Mr. Chaudhry does investigate the missing persons he, he’ll, he won’t come up with anything?

Musharraf: No he must investigate. Yes, he won’t come up with anything. He must investigate. [inaudible] he is saying…

Frost: You’d welcome that.

Musharraf: Yes, indeed. Yes, indeed. This is going on since two years, I think, two or three years, this missing persons; why don’t they investigate, OK investigate, and find out.

Frost: And what do you feel about the United States, is their use of drones something that you welcome, or do you deplore it?

Musharraf: No…

Frost: …use of drones, over Pakistan?

Musharraf: Yea. Ayee, it’s a Catch-22 situation, as far as these drones are concerned. Err, we cannot allow any foreign force to attack on our side of the border. We must use our own forces and whatever resources are lacking, Pakistan must be given those resources. What these drones see are obviously much more than we have through human intelligence. Our… we bank on human intelligence, and also some technical intelligence. So it is human intelligence, technological, and this aerial surveillance. We don’t have any kind of aerial surveillance. From the air you can certainly see what is going on on ground. Any militant activity, goups of people who are doing military training, and with weapons and concentrated in some areas. So while we would like to certainly attack them, we must attack them, because they are doing carrying out militancy, now on many occasions Pakistan forces are handicapped on attacking them in those remote areas, in a short time, before they, they vanish. I mean they are not there permanently. So therefore the need of attacking militancy on our side is definitely there, but it must be by our own forces. The resources must be provided to Pakistan. So therefore to that extent I would be against, certainly, no Pakistani would be in favour of any drone attacks. Why don’t… why isn’t Pakistan being given the drones?

Frost: So that, you’d oppose that, for those reasons?

Musharraf: Yea.

Frost: Why isn’t Pakistan not given those drones.

Musharraf: We must be provided with all the resources.

Frost: Do you think tht in fact things have changed for the better with the coming of President Obama? Do you, do you like what you see so far, or are you neutral?

Musharraf: I think he’s… I don’t see any change, really. I mean, what is the change as far as terrorism and extremism is concerned? And as far as our region and Afghanistan is concerned? There is no change. Force is required; he has taken the decision to send more force. So, what was happening in the past? There was force requirement, and he’s following exactly the same strategy.

Frost: Hearing you talk, today, President Musharraf, the… It’s clear you’re still obviously fascinated in the subject of Pakistan, and the subjects that dominated your life, in the period when you were running Pakistan, so could you be tempted back into politics, if people wanted you?

Musharraf: [Laughs] I really don’t know, I wouldn’t be able to comment at the moment. My… I always have coined a term, ‘Pakistan first’; that caught on, it’s Urdu version is ‘sab say pahlay Pakistan‘ Pakistan first. It caught on so much and… I am proud of that. So I still believe in that. Pakistan comes first. I hope and pray that the government handles Pakistan, does well for Pakistan, as I said, progress and development of the state, welfare and well-being of its people. If they can ensure this, I’ll be the happiest man. But if this is not ensured, and Pakistan is on a nosedive or a self-destruct mechanism is on and we are going and then if I, if I, can contribute something, to… to rectify the situation, certainly, I will, my life is, for the country, for Pakistan.

Frost: Well, thank you for being with us. We have covered a great deal of ground in this conversation, and we thank you very much for it, President Musharraf.

Musharraf: Thank you very much David.

Frost: Former President Musharraf, there.