President Barack Obama signs the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, also known as "Kerry-Lugar-Berman," in the Oval Office, Oct. 15, 2009. (Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy)

According to a White House Press Release, on 15 October 2009 “the President signed into law the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, also known as ‘Kerry-Lugar-Berman’” Act. Contrary to expectations in Pakistan, U.S. President Obama did not attach a signing statement to the Act, nor is there any mention in the White House Press Release of the unsigned “Joint Explanatory Statement” on the Bill/Act, released at a press conference held on 14 October 2009 by Senator John Kerry and Representative Howard L. Berman. This is significant, as it reveals that contrary to statements being made by the Zardari government,  the Explanatory Statement is an exercise in public relations and is of no substantive import whatsoever.

This post provides the official text of the Joint Explanatory Statement, from Senator Kerry’s Senate website (the underlining is in the original), along with a critique (in blue); brief introductory remarks by Senator Kerry and Representative Berman are not reproduced here. (This post follows up on earlier posts: here, here, here, and here.)

The text of the joint explanatory statement to accompany S.1707, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 is below:

The following is an explanation of S. 1707, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009.  The final text of the legislation reflects an agreement reached by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.  The purpose of this Explanatory Statement is to facilitate accurate interpretation of the text and to ensure faithful implementation of its provisions in accordance with the intentions of the legislation.

The core intent of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act is to demonstrate the American people’s long-term commitment to the people of Pakistan. The United States values its friendship with the Pakistani people and honors the great sacrifices made by Pakistani security forces in the fight against extremism, and the legislation reflects the goals shared by our two governments.

Comment: The last words are absolutely true: “our two governments”. By its failure, however, to distinguish between “the people” and the (American-installed) “government” of Pakistan, the Act betrays the people of both the United States and Pakistan, and for this reason lays the foundation for its own failure.

The legislation does not seek in any way to compromise Pakistan’s sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan’s national security interests, or micromanage any aspect of Pakistani military or civilian operations.  There are no conditions on Pakistan attached to the authorization of $7.5 billion in non-military aid.  The only requirements on this funding are financial accountability measures that Congress is imposing on the U.S. executive branch, to ensure that this assistance supports programs that most benefit the Pakistani people.

Comment: Whether it seeks it or not, the legislation does add to consistent U.S. actions to undermine the national security of Pakistan by stubbornly insisting, contrary to all logic, experience, and prevailing opinion, that India is not the primary security threat to Pakistan. Even Henry Kissinger, for example, puts this clearly his 1979 memoirs (pages 845-846):

“In the 1950s and 1960s, America, oblivious to these new countries’ [India's and Pakistan's] absorption with themselves, sought to fit them into its own preconceptions… There was no recognition that most Pakistanis considered their real security threat to be India, the very country we had enshrined in the pantheon of abstract morality and that in turn viewed our arming of Pakistan as a challenge undermining our attempt to nurture its favour.”

Some forty years later, America continues to do the same. The main things that have changed since Kissinger’s assessment is (1) America’s paramount need today to nurture India’s favour (in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the identification of the Muslim world and China as the major source of America’s insecurity), and (2) India’s resurgent ambitions to complete the unfinished agenda of 1971, on which (on the authority of Kissinger again, pp. 878-881) Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi had this to say to U.S. President Nixon (who was trying to persuade her to settle for the secession of East Pakistan, and “not shatter the cohesion of West Pakistan”) on 4-5 November 1971:

“Conditions in East Pakistan [whose dismemberment by Indian military intervention was underway, even as she spoke] reflected tendencies applicable to all of Pakistan. Neither Baluchistan nor the Northwest Frontier properly belonged to Pakistan; they too wanted and deserved greater autonomy; they should never have been part of the original settlement.”

With American blessing if not covert support, the Indians are presently engaged in plans to balkanise Pakistan, which Americans for their own reasons are camouflaging as an insurgency. There is no rational basis therefore to revise Pakistan’s assessment of India as its primary security threat. Whether intended or not, the aggressive peddling — including official U.S. efforts to muzzle dissent in Pakistan — of America’s pet myths (on safe havens, counterinsurgency, etc.) in Pakistan, do in fact undermine Pakistan’s national security.

Summary of Congressional Intent

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (the “Act”) establishes a legislative foundation for a strengthened partnership between the United States and Pakistan, based on a shared commitment to improving the living conditions of the people of Pakistan through strengthening democracy and the rule of law, sustainable economic development, and combating terrorism and extremism.  It is the intent of Congress to strengthen the long-term people-to-people relationship between the United States and Pakistan by investing directly in the needs of the Pakistani people.  This legislation is intended to fortify a lasting partnership with Pakistan based on mutual trust.

Comment: The people of Pakistan, looking at U.S. actions rather than declarations, do not see: (1) how their “living conditions” will be improved — real per capita income, at FY2000 prices, is estimated at US$460 today, the same as 7 years ago, in FY2002, when Pakistan became a major non-NATO ally of the United States, and social indicators have plummeted — by the installation of this government of convicted criminals who had stashed, and are busily engaged right now in stashing, away billions of dollars with the knowledge if not the complicity and protection of the U.S. and its allied governments? (2) how “democracy” is strengthened by virulent American propaganda, finance, and coercion against the will — right or wrong — of the overwhelming majority of the people of Pakistan? (3) how the U.S. supports the “rule of law” when it has consistently supported unconstitutional and unlawful governments in Pakistan, as long as they support American passions and interests of the day? and (4) how the consequent path of development can be “sustainable”? No one should be surprised then when the intent of the Act, stated above, is not fulfilled. As for “based on mutual trust” the language and conditionality elsewhere in the Act, commented on below, demonstrates conclusively that the Americans do not trust Pakistan.

The overall level of economic assistance authorized annually by this legislation is tripled over FY 2008 U.S. funding levels, with the bulk of aid intended for projects such as schools, roads, medical clinics, and infrastructure development.  The funds directly authorized by this Act –  $1.5 billion in economic and development assistance annually for five years, with a similar amount envisioned for a subsequent five years – place no conditions on the Government of Pakistan.  The only requirements are accountability measures placed on the United States executive branch to ensure that the aid directly benefits the Pakistani people.

Comment: (1) On the volume of aid: it is true that intended economic assistance is roughly three times the FY2009 levels (reflecting drastic long-term reductions due to sanctions, etc.), but it is also true that even so, total assistance to Pakistan will be roughly one-third that envisaged for Afghanistan, a country with one-sixth of Pakistan’s population. (2) On conditions: the statement uses a lawyerly ruse; even when Pakistan borrows from the IMF, for example, the condition is that IMF staff (and not the government) report progress by Pakistan to the IMF Board, but in order for staff to do so, the government must make the progress! (3) On accountability measures: in practice, as the Act itself notes, in the past the U.S. government has turned a blind eye to misuse of funds by favoured leaders and officials who have collaborated with the U.S. and this will continue; in the future, the Act lays the foundation, probably for the first time in U.S. legislative history, to (a) make legal, under SEC. 302(a)(2), bribes of up to $100,000 by U.S. officials, and effectively place them beyond GAO oversight, (b) create, under SEC. 101(c)(5), a $25 million slush fund (“Chief of Mission Fund”) at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad for bribery, (c) create a $400 million (“Counterinsurgency Capability”) fund to facilitate, if past experience is any guide, corruption on the military side, and finally, (d) to bill the people of Pakistan, under SECs. 103(c)(1)-(2), for $200 million of the audit and administrative expense of the U.S. government (equivalent to a steep 2.33% of the intended assistance to Pakistan). In sum, these “accountability” measures are selective, and are designed to establish a structure for facilitating corruption in Pakistan. This is not surprising, given that the stated policy of the U.S. government is that they shall “buy” the “reconcilable” leaders, and kill the others; this is being seen in Pakistan today.

This Act fully recognizes and respects the independence of Pakistan as a sovereign nation.  The purpose of this Act is to forge a closer collaborative relationship between Pakistan and the United States, not to dictate the national policy or impinge on the sovereignty of Pakistan in any way.  Any interpretation of this Act which suggests that the United States does not fully recognize and respect the sovereignty of Pakistan would be directly contrary to Congressional intent.

Comment: The Act undermines the sovereignty of Pakistan not by potential interpretation (against which this statement provides reassurance); but by its existence, legitimizing current imperial behaviour, and requiring the United States government to behave in future in a way that undermines Pakistan’s sovereignty. The United States has already occupied Pakistan (it refuses to vacate the 5 military bases provided to it by Musharraf, or allow any security, immigration, customs, civil aviation, or health officials of the government of Pakistan into the Shamsi base in Balochistan (and possibly other bases and facilities), it is engaged in extra-judicial killing of civilians in Pakistan, it engages in intelligence (together with Indian and Israeli agencies) and covert operations in Pakistan, its unlawfully armed embassy staff and contractors have been apprehended while harassing civilians and released without being charged, and has over the last two to three years quite openly micromanaged the removal of Musharraf, the passage of legislation, the constitution of the judiciary, the conduct of elections, and the installation of the present government, among numerous other acts undermining Pakistan’s sovereignty). This is the kind of extra-territoriality sought and obtained by the Americans in Iran that precipitated the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Given these facts — not differences in interpretation of language — the passage of this Act, with innumerable provisions for further intrusive actions by the U.S. government does in fact undermine the sovereignty of Pakistan, even if it is not the stated intent to do so. (How, in God’s name, do you not undermine the sovereignty of a country, while killing its civilians, coercing its military, and engineering the installation of escaped convicts as its governors?) sought and obtained by the Americans in Iran that precipitated the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Given these facts — not differences in interpretation of language — the passage of this Act, with innumerable provisions for further intrusive actions by the U.S. government does in fact undermine the sovereignty of Pakistan, even if it is not the stated intent to do so. (How, in God’s name, do you not undermine the sovereignty of a country, while killing its civilians, coercing its military, and engineering the installation of escaped convicts as its governors.

The certifications in the Act regarding certain limited forms of security assistance are consistent with previous Congressional legislation regarding security assistance to Pakistan and other nations.  In all cases, they align with the aims of, and serve to reinforce the publicly-articulated positions of, the democratically-elected Government of Pakistan, and Pakistani military leaders, to combat extremists and militants.

Comment: (1) On consistency: The certifications required may be consistent with similar requirements for certain small American dependencies, but certainly not with any assistance provided to major countries like Egypt, much less to Israel, for example. (2) On democratically-elected: The present government of Pakistan is elected, but neither lawful nor democratic. The United States has undermined the constitution of Pakistan (by supporting Musharraf, among other acts), and its laws (by coercing him to grant amnesty to criminals who had escaped to the United States and its allied countries, so that they could contest and win “elections” to serve as U.S. puppets), and working openly through Saudi and other intelligence agencies to install the present government. In this situation, the people of Pakistan cannot be accused of subscribing to the “aims” and “publicly-articulated positions” of this puppet government (but not the military, which has publicly distanced itself from this assertion). The Act, therefore, does not fulfil its stated “core intent” of building a relation with “the people of Pakistan”; it merely shores up its own puppet government of expatriates who, like Musharraf and Aziz, will run back to a “safe haven” provided by the United States, and collect payment for services rendered, the moment their external support wanes.

Sections 1-4: Strengthening a Relationship Founded on Mutual Respect

Sections 1-4 establish the framework and context for the legislative provisions that follow.  The Findings and the Statement of Principles demonstrate an unequivocal appreciation for the friendship of the Pakistani people, and for the sacrifices made by the Pakistani security forces and people in fighting extremism. The Findings in Section 3 include:

Section 3(1): “Congress finds the following: The people of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States share a long history of friendship and comity, and the interests of both nations are well-served by strengthening and deepening this friendship.” [Both these statements are not the whole truth.]

Section 3(4): “Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally of the United States and has been a valuable partner in the battle against al Qaeda and the Taliban, but much more remains to be accomplished by both nations.  The struggle against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated terrorist groups has led to the deaths of several thousand Pakistani civilians and members of the security forces of Pakistan over the past seven years.” [Pakistan is the only ally of America whose civilians are being bombed by America.]

The Statement of Principles in Section 4 include:

Section 4(1): “Pakistan is a critical friend and ally to the United States, both in times of strife and in times of peace, and the two countries share many common goals, including combating terrorism and violent radicalism, solidifying democracy and rule of law in Pakistan, and promoting the social and economic development of Pakistan.” [Half-truths, again.]

Section 4(4): “The United States supports Pakistan’s struggle against extremist elements and recognizes the profound sacrifice made by Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, including the loss of more than 1,900 soldiers and police since 2001 in combat with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups.” [More accurately: the U.S. coerces, bribes, and assists the government of Pakistan to engage in extra-judicial killings of alleged criminals and innocent civilians, and does not appreciate the sacrifice of its soldiers, always asking it to "do more".]

Title I:  Democratic, Economic and Development Assistance for Pakistan

This Title contains the core intention of this legislation: To make a long-term commitment to the people of Pakistan by tripling non-military assistance, free of any conditions on the Pakistani government.  The purposes set forth for the $7.5 billion that is authorized here are all intended to reflect the expressed priorities of the Pakistani people.  Specifically, Section 101(a) provides that:

“The President is authorized to provide assistance to Pakistan to support the consolidation of democratic institutions; to support the expansion of rule of law, build the capacity of government institutions, and promote respect for internationally-recognized human rights; to promote economic freedoms and sustainable economic development; to support investment in people, including those displaced in on-going counterinsurgency operations; and to strengthen public diplomacy.”

Comments: This repeats (ad nauseum) the lies — democracy, rule of law, there being an insurgency in Pakistan rather than U.S. condoned Indian operations to destabilise and balkanise Pakistan, to finish the unfinished agenda of 1971 — under the cover of which this “relationship” of a puppet government with its masters is to be founded under this Act.

The funds authorized under Title I are intended to be used to work with and benefit Pakistani organizations.  Specifically, Section 101(c)(3) provides that:

“The President is encouraged, as appropriate, to utilize Pakistani firms and community and local nongovernmental organizations in Pakistan, including through host country contracts, and to work with local leaders to provide assistance under this section.” [This lays the foundation of expanding the scope corruption from politicians and officials to firms, NGOs, and private individuals.]

Section 102 (a) makes clear that there are no conditions placed on the Pakistani government for delivery of the $7.5 billion in assistance.  The only accounting requirements are of the U.S. executive branch.

Comment: This is a blatant lie; Section 102 (a) reads in full: “In general.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President, for the purposes of providing assistance to Pakistan under this title and to provide assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), up to $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014.”  It isn’t obvious at all how this “makes clear that there no conditions placed on the Pakistani government”?

Section 102(d) makes clear that a long term commitment to increased civilian assistance for the people of Pakistan is envisioned by stating that it is the desire of Congress that the amounts authorized for fiscal years 2010-2014 shall continue from fiscal years 2015-2019.

Comment: True; but for the record this is “subject to an improving political and economic climate in Pakistan,” as assessed by the U.S. government in its sole discretion, and is not an unconditional commitment.

Section 103(b) authorizes establishment of field offices for Inspectors General to audit and oversee expenditure of this assistance.  It is the intent of Congress that such offices would be established in consultation with appropriate Pakistani authorities for the purpose of ensuring optimal management of resources.

Comment: The cost of which is to be billed to the people of Pakistan, and counted as aid to Pakistan.

Title II: Security Assistance for Pakistan

The intention of this section is to strengthen cooperative efforts to confront extremism.  The purposes of security assistance are intended to be completely cooperative, and reflect the intention that such assistance be used to support Pakistan in achieving its stated objectives in winning the ongoing counterinsurgency, defeating terrorist organizations that threaten Pakistan, and strengthening democratic institutions.  [All untrue.] Specifically, Section 201(1) “Purposes of Assistance” states that:

“The purposes of assistance under this title are –

(1) to support Pakistan’s paramount national security need to fight and win the ongoing counterinsurgency within its borders in accordance with its national security interests; [need, yes; paramount, no]

(2) to work with the Government of Pakistan to improve Pakistan’s border security and control and help prevent any Pakistani territory from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan, or elsewhere; [this is to appease Indian and Afghan governments, at the expense of U.S.-Pakistan relations]

(3) to work in close cooperation with the Government of Pakistan to coordinate action against extremist and terrorist targets; [with scarce regard for civilian casualties] and

(4) to help strengthen the institutions of democratic governance….” [tiresome repetition of the same lie]

Section 203(c)(2) reflects the intent that U.S. security assistance is used in furtherance of the purposes set forth in Section 201 above, e.g., ensuring Pakistan’s security, winning the counterinsurgency within Pakistan, preventing territory from being used for terrorist attacks in Pakistan and elsewhere, and coordinating action against extremist and terrorist targets.  This section requires a certification by the U.S.  executive branch to Congress regarding the efforts and progress made in achieving these purposes, and includes a series of factors to be considered collectively by the Secretary of State in making this assessment.

Comment: The real flaw in this Act, which has escaped the attention of Pakistanis and is not addressed in the Explanatory Statement, is Section 203(a) (emphasis added):

“Limitation on security-related assistance.—For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.”

In the past, the U.S. Department of Defense had been able to counter the deep-rooted bias against Pakistan, in favour of India, that has characterised the State Department throughout its history. (One of numerous examples: on 9 December 1971, amidst fears of Soviet ally India moving forces against U.S. ally West Pakistan, U.S. President Nixon was forced to remind senior U.S. government officials that “while he did not insist on the State department’s being loyal to the President, it should be loyal to the United States” — Kissinger’s memoirs, p. 904.) This section of the Act places military assistance to Pakistan under the State Department. Section 301(c) reinforces this by requiring “the Secretary of State” not the Secretary of Defense to “submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security-related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014″ including “an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204 [Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund].” Pakistan should reject assistance under this Act, on this clause alone.

The provisions applied to certain limited portions of U.S. security assistance in Section 203 are intended to be fully in line with the existing policy of the Government of Pakistan.  Specifically, Section 203(c)(1) reflects our understanding that cooperative efforts currently being undertaken by the Governments of Pakistan and the United States to combat proliferation will continue.

Comment: Section 203 (“Limitations on certain assistance”) added at the behest of India by the U.S. House of Representatives exposes the mendacity and duplicity evident in abundance in the rest of the Act. Why should clauses limiting military assistance be present in an Act to provide civilian assistance, much less one that claims to lay the foundations of long-term people to people partnership? As for Section 301(c)(1), it merits full reproduction (emphasis added):

“the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.”

Doesn’t this undermine the sovereignty of Pakistan? If not, then why doesn’t the United States provide any access to U.S. nationals who are widely perceived to be guilty of war crimes?

Comment: Section 203(c)(2), conspicuously ignored in the Explanatory Statement, is especially odious and intrusive, and provides conclusive evidence not of a “trust deficit” but of a complete lack of trust that exists among American legislators about Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies and their alleged “support” of and involvement in terrorism in Afghanistan and India, and money-laundering. In the presence of this section, the rest of the Act makes no sense whatsoever. It is significant that the title of the Act now speaks of “Enhanced Partnership” rather than the more honest “Enhanced Strategic Partnership” which had been the title of all but the final version of the Bills.

As for money-laundering, it is the United States and U.S. banks that have actively supported, facilitated, and protected money-laundering by Pakistani leaders as long as these leaders have served U.S. interests. The prime example is the American-sponsored president of Pakistan, Asif Zardari, whose money laundering (by Citibank)  is ably documented in U.S. Congressional committee reports (Minority Staff Report, an annex to S.Hrg 106-428, text | pdf); Citibank staff mentioned in this report include the former prime minister, and the present finance minister and central bank governor of Pakistan.

Section 203(c)(3) includes a provision intended to express support for democratic institutions in Pakistan.

Comment: Is this for real? Section 203(c)(3) reads: “the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.” In other words, they are subverting these processes, but not materially and substantially!

The Statement skips over Section 203(d), which makes reference to “Letters of Offer and Acceptance signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006″ ["PK-D-YAD, PK-D-NAP, and PK-D-SAF"]. What are these letters? The people of Pakistan would like to know.

Section 203(e) contains a waiver making clear that this certification could be waived if the determination is made by the Secretary of State in the interests of national security [of the United States, but not of Pakistan] that this was necessary to continue such assistance.

Title III. Strategy, Accountability, Monitoring, and Other Provisions.

The intention of this section is to ensure that there is transparency and accountability in the way authorized assistance is spent.  This Title requires the U.S. executive branch to provide various reports to Congress designed to demonstrate that funds are being used for the purposes set forth in Title I and Title II; there are no requirements on the Government of Pakistan.

Comment: It is unseemly for the representatives of a great people to employ arguments suitable to a used car salesman. Of course there are performance requirements on the government and people of Pakistan; how else, would the U.S. Secretary of State describe to the Congress, inter alia, “the role [to be worked out by the U.S.] to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders” (Section 301(a)(4)) in the drama that is this Act; and to grade Pakistan on the state of: civil liberties, political rights, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, immunization rates, public expenditure on health, girls’ primary education completion rate, public expenditure on primary education, natural resource management, business start-up, land rights and access, trade policy, regulatory quality, inflation control, and fiscal policy (SEC. 301(a)(6)); or provide the certification, justification, notification, review, etc. required under the Act?

These are “conditions on Pakistan”. While the U.S. may argue that these conditions have been imposed on the U.S. government, their ability to satisfy these conditions depends entirely on performance by Pakistan. As anyone familiar with the receipt of conditional assistance knows the certification of performance requires performance by the recipient.

Section 301 “Strategy Reports” requires three reports from the U.S.  executive branch that detail a plan for how U.S. assistance to Pakistan will be spent and evaluated and a regional security plan for how the United States can best work with its partners [including India] for “effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts [exclusively in Pakistan].”

Comment: On the 3 Strategy Reports: (1) Assistance Strategy Report (ASR), (2) a Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report (CRSR), and (3) Security-Related Assistance Plan (SRAP):

(1) The ASR will include, inter alia, a description based on consultations of the role to be played by co-opted Pakistanis (SEC. 301(a)(4)), and will grade Pakistan on the state of: civil liberties, political rights, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, immunization rates, public expenditure on health, girls’ primary education completion rate, public expenditure on primary education, natural resource management, business start-up, land rights and access, trade policy, regulatory quality, inflation control, and fiscal policy (SEC. 301(a)(6))!

(2) The Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report (CRSR) is to be a comprehensive regional strategy, to be designed by U.S. officials on behalf of their President, in cooperation with the governments of India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, “to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan” (SEC. 301(b)).

(3) As for SRAP, as noted earlier, by requiring “the Secretary of State” not the U.S. Secretary of Defense to oversee military and security assistance to Pakistan, the Act effectively cuts off the long-standing durable relation between the two militaries, and ensures that in any dispute between India and Pakistan, the U.S. bureaucracy and government would “tilt” decisively in favour of India, against Pakistan. This is the most significant, least noticed, feature of the Act, which should be a “deal-breaker” for Pakistan. The Statement’s description of a joint U.S.-India plan for dealing with security problems within Pakistan as “a regional security plan for how the United States can best work with its partners” is disingenuous, to put it mildly.

Section 302 “Monitoring Reports” reflects the need for ongoing consultation between the U.S executive branch and Congress on monitoring U.S. assistance to Pakistan, including a “Semi-Annual Monitoring Report” where:

“The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period.”

Comment: To lay the ground-work for the corruption that is envisaged Section 302 (a) (2) provides for “a classified annex, if necessary” in which to report “a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000″ under Title I of this Act.

The many requirements of this report are intended as a way for Congress to assess how effectively U.S. funds are being spent, shortfalls in U.S. resources that hinder the use of such funds, and steps the Government of Pakistan has taken to advance our mutual interests in countering extremism and nuclear proliferation and strengthening democratic institutions.

Comment: It is not clear how, for example, “a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise” (Section 302(a)(12)) — and many of the 20 (counting sub-sections) other such areas to be monitored semi-annually — can be described “as a way for Congress to assess how effectively U.S. funds are being spent.”

There is no intent to, and nothing in this Act in any way suggests that there should be, any U.S. role in micromanaging internal Pakistani affairs, including the promotion of Pakistani military officers or the internal operations of the Pakistani military.

Comment: Then what is the meaning and intent of SEC. 302 of the Act that requires the Secretary of State to submit a Semi-Annual Monitoring Report,

“that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include— …
(15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.” (Underline added)

The reports envisioned in this Section are not binding on Pakistan, and require only the provision of information by the executive branch to the U.S. Congress, in furtherance of the Act’s stated purpose of strengthening civilian institutions and the democratically-elected Government of Pakistan.

Comment: This is the 10th mention of “democratic” in this short statement; clearly Senator Kerry and President Zardari are reading from the same script! Are the Americans following Goebbels: “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.”