Global Perspectives on the "Af/Pak" War
Saturday February 11th 2012

Who Will Defend Pakistan? A Humorous Story from the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War

Ichhogil (BRB Link) Canal, Pakistan, 1965. The milestone reads Lahore 14 Miles. (Brig. Hari Singh Deora, 18th Cavalry, Indian Army/Posted by his grandson at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ichhogil_Canal_%281965_Indo-Pak_War%29_.jpg))

Bridge over an overflowing Ichhogil (BRB Link) Canal, Pakistan, 1965. The milestone reportedly reads "Lahore 14 Miles". (Picture taken by Lt. Col. Hari Singh Deora, 18th Cavalry, Indian Army, later Brigadier / Cropped from original image and notes posted by his grandson at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ichhogil_Canal_%281965_Indo-Pak_War%29_.jpg))

Although the details were warmly contested after the event, a section of informed opinion in Pakistan has held that it was not the Pakistan Army but the fortuitous unseasonal presence of water in the canals which stopped the Indian tanks from rolling on to seize Lahore in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.

The BRB (formally, the Bambanwalla-Ravi-Bedian link, which the Indians call the Ichhogil) Canal runs along the Indian border from the Ravi north-east of Lahore (see map below: the Canal is the thin line running parallel to the left edge of the map) to where the Sutlej river enters Pakistan towards the south, and is linked to and from by a network of smaller canals (not seen on the map).1

Map showing the Indian border (in yellow) where the Ravi River finally snakes back into Pakistan, and the north end of the BRB Canal (under the Ravi riverbed, to the left).

Map showing the Pakistan-India border (in yellow) where the Ravi River finally snakes back into Pakistan, and the upper part of the BRB Canal (running due south from the Ravi riverbed, toward the left in the map).

AFTER the conclusion of hostilities, the story is told, a series of meetings were held, not only in the military but also in the civil bureaucracy, to see what actions should be taken in the light of a review of the war experience. The Chief Secretary, Punjab Government chaired one such meeting of important government officials. Despite its disdain of all things civilian, the Army, always proper to a fault, sent a General to the meeting.

A relatively junior officer from the provincial Irrigation Department, armed with maps, had been asked to make an initial background presentation. The officer started his presentation by unfurling one by one the rolls of maps which he had carried in under his arms. With each map, he presented the technical data (on layout, water flows, seasonality, contingency plans for diversion, linkage to hydro-electicity generation, etc.) Having acquited himself of this unusual assignment, he stood back to assist his seniors, as necessary.

After some discussion among senior civil officers, the audience turned expectantly to the General. Aware that he was the only person in the room knowledgeable on the matter under discussion, the General decided to have some fun rather than waste his wisdom on junior civilian officers.

Instead of addressing the senior officers present, he turned to the Irrigation Department officer, “Well, young man, if the Indian army was advancing toward Lahore and the Canal was dry, what would you do to defend Lahore?”

The question clearly was unexpected but the officer did not lack altogether in experience. Undaunted, he thought for a moment and offered a solution in terms of which veirs would have to be shut, and which opened, to divert water flows from other sources.

The General smiled and pressed his advantage, “And if the Indians bombed the veirs?” The officer was not prepared for this but he did the best he could, “Well, Sir, as you know the water table is high in the area. We could construct a series of tubewells along the Canal which could be used to fill it, if necessary.” He indicated the locations on a map.

The element of surprise seemed to be lost, but the General persisted, “And on what would you run these tubewells?” The officer was forced to defend his hypothetical solution: “Electricity, Sir, would seem to be the natural choice,” he said, “since the logistic difficulties of supplying diesel to dispersed tubewells in a time of war would seem to be insurmountable.” He went on to point out the potential power stations that could be used.

The General paused for a moment, and then allowed himself a broad smile. Leaning further back in his chair he delivered what was obviously meant as the coup de grâce, “And what if the Indians bombed the grid station?”

The officer took his time but was clearly out of solutions. “In that case, General,” he replied, “I guess you’ll just have to fight!”

  1. Not being familiar with the area, I have relied on the Wikipedia (see links above to the article and image), and on information (especially on the “BRB” being the same as the “Ichhogil” Canal) provided by A. H. Amin, The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965, posted at http://military-maps.blogspot.com/2008/11/how-lahore-was-saved-and-pakistans_9174.html, accessed on 21 October 2009. The reader is warned that at least in one instance Mr. Amin’s language may cause offence.

No related posts.

Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.

Leave a Reply

You must be logged in to post a comment.