Guradian | Letters | By Stuart Worsely | 4 November 2009

There is a short-sightedness in this article (Afghans will pay the price for a man hellbent on victory, 3 November [by Peter Galbraith]) that seems to think the story started with this election and fails to respond to the larger patterns at play. Hamid Karzai was implanted initially by the US in the lead-up to the formation of a new government in 2001. He was meant to raise an enthusiastic resistance to the Taliban and march on Kabul. He could not, and had to be airlifted by the US to safety, to be implanted later. He was widely regarded as a stooge.

Many friends of mine joined his government, recognising his position as the best of a series of less attractive options. But as time passed, Karzai’s position became politically untenable with the Afghan people. US atrocities undermined his ability to be free-standing, and gradually he started to become less obedient. He began to get some local support for his stands against the foreign forces and political actors, and consolidated a local affection that he hitherto had not had.

As Karzai’s disobedience to the diktats of his erstwhile masters increased, so too did American and UN pressure on Karzai to step aside. It was, however, clear from the outset that, domestically, Karzai was now getting quite popular. So when the UN election procedure was suggested, the Afghan government was naturally suspicious and did not want to kowtow more than absolutely necessary.

The election was probably rigged extensively by both sides. But in that the very notion of a public election is a new idea for the country, that is hardly surprising. The question at hand is not whether the election was done properly, but whether the appointment of Karzai is legitimate. I sense that it is, because more people want him than want any other. Elections are one way to indicate this, but there are others too.

The best we can do for Afghanistan now is to offer a helping hand to the new government. To snipe from the sidelines and create the perception of illegitimacy because of foreigners’ failure to understand domestic political patterns can only destabilise further, and make recovery and the quest for equilibrium harder.