“Religious discussions will be frequent. Say what you like about your own side, and avoid criticism of theirs, unless you know that the point is external, when you may score heavily by proving it so. With the Bedu [Bedouin], Islam is so all-pervading an element that there is little religiosity, little fervor, and no regard for externals. Do not think from their conduct that they are careless. Their conviction of the truth of their faith, and its share in every act and thought and principle of their daily life is so intimate and intense as to be unconscious, unless roused by opposition. Their religion is as much a part of nature to them as is sleep or food.” — British Imperial Agent, T. E. Lawrence (‘of Arabia’), quoted with approval in the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24.2, page D-3)

“U.S. is not here to help. They are just after [our] religion and culture.” — Afghan Elder

“[We have little understanding of the local environment and are] disengaged from the people in the best position to find answers.” — Major General Michael Flynn, Head of U.S. intelligence in Afghanistan

UPDATE: See also: Americans Issuing Bible Inscribed Guns to Muslim Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan (19 January 2010)

Global Post | By Marisa L. Porges | 18 January 2010
Opinion: Messages from Afghanistan
Without trust and understanding, counterinsurgency efforts are bound to fail — 30,000 more troops or not.

WASHINGTON — A few weeks ago, over tea and khatai cookies, a senior mullah asked me why the United States was in Afghanistan and what the international community hoped to accomplish there.

The mullah was not ill-informed, and his frank questions were not rhetorical. They reflected the profound lack of trust and understanding that still exists between U.S. officials and their Afghan interlocutors — a problem that must be addressed for any U.S. strategy in Afghanistan to work, with or without 30,000 more troops.

That this mullah and the other tribal elders with whom I shared tea — who were from Khost and provinces in southeastern Afghanistan where the insurgency remains most active — couldn’t describe the goals of soldiers and diplomats in their midst, warrants concern by every American official working in Afghanistan. Even after following the U.S. troop activities for eight years and watching recent strategic debates unfold in the press, they remain confused.

Lack of understanding leads too easily to disaffection. As another mullah noted, the Taliban has already convinced many Afghans that the “U.S. is not here to help. They are just after [our] religion and culture.”

Misunderstanding prevails, for everyone involved, because Afghans and Americans have talked past one another for years. The head of U.S. intelligence in Afghanistan, Major General Michael Flynn, recently drew similar conclusions for U.S. intelligence officers there, publicly reporting that they had little understanding of the local environment and are “disengaged from the people in the best position to find answers.”

Unfortunately, my frank conversation with this group — the Afghan community leaders who, in many ways, have the greatest impact on the local population and the trajectory of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts — suggested that the problem is more widespread and affects multiple facets of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan.

This gives rise to the frustration expressed by a second tribal elder at my meeting, who bemoaned the fact that no American understood his perspective. Along with fellow community leaders, he had tried to provide input to U.S. officials for years but never felt like they were heard. This included discussions with Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the Americans who most often interact with local Afghans. As a result, he described the mood of his community as “quite disappointed these days” and noted his own skepticism of current U.S. efforts.

Injecting humor into the mix, one tribal elder remarked that it was “nice to finally talk with an American who’s not armed.” He welcomed our casual and open exchange but hinted at the underlying wariness that’s dominated American-Afghan conversations for years and haunts our ongoing dialogue. We don’t trust many of our Afghan interlocutors. In turn, they don’t trust us.