In executing the Obama administration’s plan to expand the war in Afghanistan across international borders to Pakistan (hence “Af/Pak” war), two major bureaucratic shifts are being worked out:

1. In pursuit of a comprehensive (“all government”) approach to the war, much of the traditional responsibility for diplomacy, and military and economic assistance, is being shifted from the State Department to the Department of Defence (the modalities of how this authority will be exercised “in consultation with State Department” are being worked out); and
2. In order to “win over” (i.e. bribe) the “reconcilable” insurgents, an enormous slush fund, with minimal oversight, is being provided to the theatre commanders (Generals Petraeus and McChrystal) under a variety of heads of account, including the huge Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF), for which a supplementary appropriation of $400 million is being processed for the remainder of FY 2009, and $700 million [pdf] are requested for FY 2010.

To justify its request for PCCF before the US Congress, the administration orchestrated a chorus of imminent doom — like the 2 weeks in which Pakistan was to have collapsed in the face of an insurgency, according to Gen. Petraeus, that passed a few days ago — and argued that funds were needed to provide counterinsurgency training to the Pakistan Army.

According to Spencer Ackerman, “This is a COIN [counter-insurgency] capability the Pakistanis need ASAP if the United States isn’t going to invade the Pakistani tribal areas. It took real effort on the part of Sens. John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) this week just to get the foreign aid budget request fully funded. One foot before the other… there remains an as-yet unanswered question: the aid money that the Bush administration gave to the Pakistani military came primarily in the form of untraceable cash transfers. Yes, really. After the United States signed away the cash, it literally had no oversight into how it got spent.”

It seems, however, that the Pakistan Army was not taken into confidence in the con job being pulled over the US Congress. As a result, the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army reacted sharply to the suggestion that his troops required training. On 17 May 2009, all leading newspapers in Pakistan [e.g. The News, The Nation, Dawn] reported on the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Press Release [No. 137/2009-ISPR, dated 16 May 2009, reproduced in full at the end of this post] to the effect that Chief of Army Staff General Kayani has stated that the Pakistan Army is well equipped to carry out counter-insurgency operations and did not require any training by foreigners!

In addition to providing an ample war chest to the US generals, as Ackerman reports on 15 May 2009, some 25 to 50 Special Operations Command (SOC) personnel will join the 70 who are already there to provide “training” to the Frontier Corps. Thus, as we posted earlier, on the pattern of Vietnam, there will be no US troops in Pakistan; only trainers and advisors.  As Ackerman counsels: “Watch to see if the distinction between “training” and “fighting” remains a hard and fast one.”

PRESS RELEASE [TEXT]

Lately a lot of comments from various quarters are coming on the level of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) training of Pakistani troops and about their shifting from eastern borders. Regarding LIC training, COAS stated that Pakistan Army has developed a full range of counter insurgency training facilities tailored to train troops for such operations. Therefore, except for very specialized weapons and equipment, high technology, no generalized foreign training is required. Owing to its vast experience, Pakistan Army remains the best suited force to operate in its own area. Uncalled for aspersions through various quarters on our training methods / orientation is apparently due to lack of knowledge and understanding of our training system in vogue, he said.

Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani reaffirmed that strategic decisions regarding where, when and how many troops are deployed in each operation or sector is always a Pakistani decision based on objective analysis and our full understanding of threat spectrum. These decisions are undertaken in accordance with our national interest by our leadership keeping in view the aspirations of people of Pakistan. Any outside advice/subjective comments towards this end is counter productive and divisive in effect rather than helpful. [Emphasis in original.]

End | (Not Continued)