Withdraw Troops from the Indian Border — Wall Street Journal Publishes Former Indian Intelligence Officer’s Advice to Pakistan!

B. Raman, a 26-year veteran of the Indian intelligence agency, Research Analysis Wing (RAW, see earlier post on its role in creation of Bangladesh) writes in — where else — the Wall Street Journal that — what else — Pakistan must withdraw its forces from the Indian border in order to “do more” internally.

Swat Is Not Enough
Pakistan’s army faces a long, uphill struggle to beat the Taliban.

By BAHUKUTUMBI RAMAN From today’s Wall Street Journal Asia.

The Pakistani army recaptured the largest city in Swat Valley Saturday in what was hailed as a major victory. But the army’s mission against the Pakistani Taliban is far from finished. Troops are likely to face a stalemate in operations in other areas of the Swat Valley, the Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The success or failure of Pakistan’s fight against terror will hinge on cleaning out the terrorists from these areas.

The month-long operation in Swat is a good start. The army is reportedly back in control of Mingora, the most important town in the valley that had come under the control of the Taliban. The army is also making headway against the Taliban in other adjoining districts.

Yet this is a difficult, ongoing fight. The Pakistani Taliban is emulating tactics used by the Afghan Taliban against U.S.-led troops. Its leaders, senior commanders and junior-level fighters have dispersed into small groups and taken shelter in the mountainous areas. These areas can only be attacked from the air and through long-range artillery — not from the ground by infantry units.

The army claims to have killed more than 1,200 junior-level fighters of the Taliban over the past month, but no senior leaders or commanders have been confirmed captured or dead. The command and control of the Pakistani Taliban, like that of the Afghan Taliban, remains intact. So long as their leaders remain alive, the Pakistani Taliban will be able to stage a comeback.

RAW has long supported the creation of "Pakhtunistan"

Other battles in the Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are also hitting roadblocks. In the Khyber area, the Taliban continues to disrupt logistic supplies to NATO troops from Karachi. In South Waziristan, the army’s control is weak. In North Waziristan, where al Qaeda remnants are based, the army is not active.

To win this battle once and for all, the Pakistani Taliban must be neutralized operationally and ideologically. Operational neutralization means strengthening the Pakistani army’s control over the areas freed from the Taliban and protecting them from future attacks until stability is restored. Ideological neutralization means weaning the local population away from the negative ideas of the Taliban.

Both would require difficult sacrifices. To win the operational war, the army would need to withdraw troops from the Indian border. The army is disinclined to do this. To win the ideological war, Pakistan would have to invest heavily in social and economic infrastructure — such as affordable schools, higher educational institutions, and the creation of jobs for the unemployed so jihad ceases to be a means of livelihood for the youth.

This project may take well over a decade to show results. But there is no alternative to it. The Pakistani Taliban is the result of more than 60 years of neglect in the tribal areas — neglect of education, economic development, basic governance, police administration and communications infrastructure. While the Pakistani army may win some tactical victories, a strategic triumph can come about only if the political and military leadership reverse that course.

Pakistan’s leaders now seem to realize the spreading Talibanization poses an existential threat to Pakistan. But they have yet to admit their earlier policies are largely responsible for the present state of affairs. They seem to think that to end the Taliban, all they need is a few military victories. Such victories are important, but their results will not be enduring without an improvement in governance.

The Pakistani Taliban isn’t the only threat to Pakistan’s existence. There are other terrorist groups of older vintage in the Punjab, such as Lashkar e Taiba — an outfit that developed and flourished despite the fact of the Punjab province being economically the most well-developed area. They owe their existence and growth to the Pakistani intelligence service, which funded them and closed its eyes to their training camps. They are seen not as existential threats but as strategic assets necessary for the existence of Pakistan. Their ideology is no different from that of the Pakistani Taliban, and their links with al Qaeda are just as strong.

By failing to act against these groups, Pakistan is sowing the seeds of new pockets of instability and radicalization. First the army needs to win the war in Swat and the border regions. Then it needs to win the hearts and minds of Pakistanis and prevent the radicalization of its officers and other ranks. The Taliban is unlikely to capture Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal outright. But radicalizing the top echelons of the army would be just as dangerous.

Mr. Raman served in India’s external intelligence agency from 1968 to 1994 and on the National Security Advisory Board of the government of India from 2000 to 2002.